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ABSTRACT
Ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has been
awakened to the threat that extremist organizations pose to our national security.

The greatest

transnational terrorist threat to the United States right now comes primarily from extremist
groups such as Al-Queda, Hamas, and Hezbollah. These extremist groups are fueled by the
desire to influence political, religious, and/or ideological causes. The political “end-state” or
objective of the extremist is to overthrow “heretic” governments which currently exist and
replace them with Islamic governments based on the rule of the Shariah (the first book of the
Quran which strongly regulates all aspects of life). (Swanson, Territo, & Taylor, 2007, p. 87-89)
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a qualitative analysis of the sources of extremism from
two different perspectives (United States government and local Muslims), determine if The
National Intelligence Estimate 2007 properly identifies the sources of extremism, and make
recommendations on how to counter the sources of extremism/radicalization and improve
security and counterterrorism strategy. The research questions which will guide this study
include: What are the primary sources of Islamic Extremism; what do the prominent authors in
this field of study identify as sources of extremism; what do the National Intelligence Estimate
2007 and other US government documents identify as the sources of Islamic extremism; and
what does the local Muslim population identify as the sources/causes of extremism?
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION TO THE STUDY
Ever since the terrorist attacks of September 11, 2001, the United States has been
awakened to the threat that Islamic extremist organizations pose to our national security.

The

greatest transnational terrorist threat to the United States right now comes primarily from
extremist groups such as Al-Queda, Hamas, and Hezbollah. This form of terrorism is fueled by
the desire to influence political, religious, and/or ideological causes. The political “end-state” or
objective of the extremist is to overthrow “heretic” governments which currently exist and
replace them with Islamic governments based on the rule of the Shariah (the first book of the
Koran which strongly regulates all aspects of life). (Swanson, Territo, & Taylor, 2007, p. 87-89)
Historically, this conflict can be traced back to the establishment of Israel in 1948 and the
subsequent support given to Israel by the United States. In recent years, the extremist groups
have grown in number and have increased their efforts. The most significant attacks against the
United States during the past ten years have been led by fundamentalist extremist groups acting
from remote locations such as Afghanistan, Lebanon, Yemen, Iraq, and Iran. Extremism remains
a clear and present threat to United States national security due to its recent history of attacks, its
increasing ability to radicalize moderate Muslims living within the United States resulting in an
ever expanding internal threat of “homegown” terrorists, and the religious devotion to their goal
resulting in their refusal to negotiate or accept anything less than the complete and utter
destruction of their enemies.
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Statement of the Problem
The first attack within the United States connected with Islam and extremism was the
first bombing of the World Trade Center – February 26th, 1993, which killed 5 people. During
the ensuing investigation, several links were identified with fundamentalist groups in Egypt and
resulted in indictments of Arab nationals living within the United States. One of those
responsible was a blind Sheik named Abdul Omar Rahman who was both a spiritual leader and
scholar. In 1980, two out of 64 groups were categorized as largely religious in motivation, but
by 1995 almost half of the identified groups, 26 out of 56, were classified as religiously
motivated; the majority of these groups espoused Islam as their guiding force. (Moore, 2001, p.
1)
Some characteristics that all terrorist organizations have in common are: They are
political in their aims and motives; they use violence or the threat of violence in pursuit of their
goals/objectives; and their actions are designed to have far reaching psychological repercussions
beyond the immediate victim or target (having long lasting second and third order effects).
(Howard, Sawyer, Bajema, 2008, pg. 33) The overall results of a terrorist attack are also similar:
The loss of faith in social and governmental structure; safety and security are compromised and
questioned; and the terrorist attack destroys solidarity, cooperation and interdependence on
which social functioning is based and substitutes instead insecurity and distrust. (Swanson, et al,
2007, pg. 85)
The most popular transnational terrorist threat currently facing the United States is AlQueda. According to the July 2007 National Intelligence Estimate,
“The main threat comes from Islamic terrorist groups and cells,
especially al-Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack
the Homeland and a continued effort by these terrorist groups to
adapt and improve their capabilities. Al-Qa’ida is and will remain
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the most serious terrorist threat to the Homeland, as its central
leadership continues to plan high impact plots, while pushing others
in extremist Sunni communities to mimic its efforts and to supplement
its capabilities.” (National Intelligence Estimate, 2007, p. 6)
Al-Queda, which was led by Osama bin Laden and Ayman al-Zawarahi, is a loose network of
many different fundamental Islamic groups located in several different and diverse countries. AlQueda’s stated goal is to “re-establish the Muslim state throughout the world via the overthrow
of corrupt regimes in the Islamic world and the removal of foreign presence – primarily
American and Israeli – from the Middle East.” (Moore, 2001, p. 5) Their ideology is primarily
based on the writings and teachings of Sayyid Muhammad Qubt and Ibn Wahhab, early Islamic
scholars who called for a violent purification movement throughout the Middle East and greater
Islamic world. (Swanson, et al, 2007, p. 89) This movement is commonly referred to as
“Wahhabism.” Followers of Wahhabism are fighting in a “Holy War” or “Jihad” which calls for
every Muslim to join their fight against the West (United States). In 1996, Osama Bin Laden
issued a declaration of war against the United States calling us the “Great Satan” and later in
1998 Bin Laden went on to state that it was the duty of all Muslims to kill United States citizens,
civilian or military, and their allies. (Moore, 2001. p. 5) Since Osama Bin Laden’s declaration,
Al-Queda has been responsible for several attacks against the United States including: the 1998
suicide bombings of United States Embassies in Kenya & Tanzania which resulted in 224 dead,
the 2000 suicide bombing of the U.S.S. Cole in Yemen which killed 17 American sailors, and
most recently, the September 11, 2001 attack on the World Trade Center and Pentagon which
resulted in more than 2,800 casualties. (Swanson, et al, 2007, p. 89)
Another Islamic terrorist group that the United States needs to be concerned with is
Hamas. Hamas is the largest and most influential Palestinian militant movement today and is
primarily located in the Gaza Strip and West Bank. The word “HAMAS” means “zeal” in
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Arabic, but it is also an Arabic acronym for “Harakut al-Muqawama al-Islamiya” or “Islamic
Resistance Movement.” Hamas is also a result of the Islamic Wahhabism movement. Sheik
Ahmed Yassin, its founder and spiritual leader, was assassinated by the Israeli government on
March 22, 2004 after a prayer service he was attending in a Jerusalem Mosque. (Swanson, et al,
2007, p. 93) Hamas is perhaps different from Al-Queda in that it is not only known for its
violence, but also for its attempts to rebuild much of the social infrastructure within the
Palestinian community. While responsible for 90% of all suicide bombings throughout Israel
during the past several years, Hamas is also responsible for building new roads, schools, and
other social services in the territories of the West Bank and Gaza. Hamas is responsible for the
deaths of more than 500 people in more than 350 separate terrorist attacks since 1993. Hamas is
known for its use of suicide bombers, but not all of their attacks utilize this tactic. (CFR Hamas,
2007)
Hezbollah, which means “Party of God,” is a terrorist organization found primarily in
Lebanon, Syria, and Iran. Its mission is to develop a “Pan-Islamic” republic throughout the
Middle East and is supported by religious clerics in Iran. The driving force behind this
organization is the desired destruction of Israel and the liberation of Jerusalem which they feel is
a religious obligation for all Muslims. Its leader, Hassan Nasrallah, has effectively directed the
organization since the first Israeli invasion into Lebanon in 1982 and has continued to rise in
popularity among the Lebanese people. (Swanson, et al, 2007, p. 94) Hezbollah is responsible
for: the 1983 bombing of the Marine barracks in Beirut, Lebanon which killed 241 Marines, the
1985 hijacking of TWA flight 847, and the 1996 bombing of Khobar Towers Air Force Housing
Complex in Khobar, Saudi Arabia which killed 19 service members and wounded an additional
374 individuals, including several local nationals. (CFR Hezbollah, 2007)
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Although transnational terrorist organizations such as Al-Queda, Hamas, and Hezbollah
continue to pose a significant threat to United States security, a more serious threat has recently
emerged. As expressed in an April 2009 article produced by the FDD’s Center for Terrorism
Research, “Homegrown terrorists pose a particular concern due to the increasing number of
Westerners joining militant Islamic movements, and the operatives’ familiarity with the societies
they are targeting.” (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 11) The report identifies six
indicators of Jihadist radicalization which can be observed in homegrown terrorists: The
adoption of a legalistic interpretation of Islam, coming to trust only a select and ideologically
rigid group of religious authorities, a perceived schism between Islam and the West, manifesting
a low tolerance for perceived theological deviance, attempting to impose religious beliefs on
others, and the expression of radical political views. (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p.
18) According to this report, over 200 men and women born or raised in the West have either
participated in or provided support for extremist terrorist plots and attacks in recent years. The
report goes on to further identify four distinct phases that homegrown terrorists experience along
their path to radicalization: Pre-radicalization, self-identification, indoctrination, and finally
jihadization. The pre-radicalization phase consists of the period before an individual begins their
journey towards extremism and is followed by the self-identification phase which consists of the
individual beginning to explore Salafi Islam and accepting a more extremist view of Islam. The
third step in the radicalization process involves “indoctrination” where the individual’s radical
beliefs are intensified and the individual “wholly adopts Jihadi-Salafi ideology and concludes,
without question, that the conditions and circumstances exist where action is required to support
and further the Salafist cause. That action is militant Jihad.” (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 36) The
final phase of the radicalization process is “Jihadization” and involves the individual’s
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acceptance of their duty to participate in Jihad and proclaim themselves as holy warriors or
mujahedeen. (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 22)
Examples of this radicalization process within the United States include: The Lackawana
Six, The Portland Seven, and The Northern Virginia Paintball as well as individual homegrown
cases such as John Walker Lindh, Adam Gadahn, and Daniel Joseph Maldonado. The July 2007
National Intelligence Estimate also assesses that,
“The spread of radical – especially Salafi - Internet sites, increasingly
aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the growing number of
radical, self-generating cells in Western countries indicate that the
radical and violent segment of the West’s Muslim population is
expanding, including the United States.” (National Intelligence
Estimate, 2007)
The intelligence estimate goes on to state that the arrest and prosecution of a small number of
violent extremists within the United States points to the possibility that others are likely to
follow the radicalization process and conclude that the use of violence here in the United States
is both legitimate and warranted. This argument is echoed in the 2007 Council on Foreign
Relations which states, “Experts say it is quite likely the next terrorist attack in the United States
will not be the work of well-trained al-Queda operatives sent from abroad, but rather that of an
American citizen.” (CFR American Muslims, 2007)
Although the majority of the homegrown terrorists identified in the United States have
been radicalized Muslims, the United States runs the risk of alienating the American Muslim
community through its attempts to combat homegrown terrorism. In the case of the “Lackawana
Six”, a group of Yemeni-Americans who attended a terrorist training camp in Afghanistan, it
was the reports of suspicion from other American Muslims within the community which led to
the initial government investigation and subsequent arrest of the six men plotting an assault on
Fort Dix, New Jersey. It is therefore imperative that the national strategy for combating the
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radicalization process of moderate Muslims includes civic engagement efforts. (GartensteinRoss & Grossman, 2009, p. 59) Former Homeland Security secretary Michael Chertoff
supported this technique when he stated, “An effective strategy to prevent and counter domestic
radicalization requires that we not only engage these communities, but also take proactive steps
to build trust and respond to issues of concern to Americans of different ethnicities, cultures, and
faiths.” (Gartenstein-Ross & Grossman, 2009, p. 60)
The process of radicalization proliferates in the United States through, “The internet,
certain Salafi-based NGO’s, extremist sermons/study groups, Salafi literature, jihadi videotapes,
extremist-sponsored trips to radical madrassas and militant training camps abroad have served as
‘extremist incubators’ for young, susceptible Muslims.” (Silber & Bhatt, 2007, p. 82-83) To
effectively combat this process, the United States must rely on moderate Muslim clerics and the
American Muslim communities to identify at-risk younger Muslims and intervene with the
radicalization process prior to their adoption of a fundamentalist or Salafi-based extremist view
of Islam. Unfortunately, if these young, susceptible Muslims are not identified and reached prior
to their indoctrination into the Jihadi-Salafi agenda, they will most likely become a highly
dangerous threat.
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Timeline of Recent Radical Extremist Significant Events:
Below is a current timeline or recent history of Radical Extremist organizations and
significant international events:
1979 (Feb) Ayatollah Khomeni established the Islamic Republic of Iran; United States seen as a
potential enemy of Islam and as being intrusive in Islamic affairs
1983 (Apr) Bombing of US Embassy in Beirut; demonstrates the effectiveness of violence
1983 (Oct) Bombing of US Marine barracks in Beirut
1985 (Oct) Achille Lauro hijacking in eastern Mediterranean
1989 (Feb) Last Soviet forces withdraw from Afghanistan; demonstrates the weakness of other
Western Cultures and the ability of Islamic forces to win against a military super power
1991 (Feb) Defeat of Saddam Hussein in Gulf War; demonstration of the United States
willingness to wage war against an Islamic State
1991 (Dec) Collapse of Soviet Union
1993 (Feb) Omar Abdel Rahman, blind Egyptian sheik, helped guide and execute the First
World Trade Center bombing; demonstrates the United States vulnerability to terrorist attacks
1993 (Oct) Battle of Mogadishu, Somalia
1996 (Jun) Khobar Towers bombing in Saudi Arabia
1996 (Aug) Usama bin Laden issues fatwa Declaration of War against the Americans Occupying
the Land of the Two Holy Places
1998 (Feb) Usama bin Laden, Ayman al-Zawahiri, et al. issue World Islamic Front Declaration
of Jihad against the Jews and the Crusaders
1998 (Aug) US Embassy Bombings in Tanzania and Kenya
2000 (Oct) USS Cole bombed in Yemeni port
2001 (Jun) Al-Qaida and Egyptian Islamic Jihad complete merger
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2001 (Sep) 11 September 2001 terrorist attacks against the US
2001 (Oct) Start of war in Afghanistan (Operation Enduring Freedom)
2001 (Dec) Zawahiri publishes AQ manifesto Knights Under the Prophet’s Banner
2002 (July) Egyptian gunman kills two Israelis and injures four at the El Al ticket counter at the
Los Angeles International Airport
2002 (Oct) Usama bin Laden releases letter To the Americans
2003 (Mar) Start of war in Iraq (Operation Iraqi Freedom)
2003 (Dec) Two assassination attempts against Pakistani President Musharraf
2004 (Mar) Madrid train bombings
2005 (Jul) London public transportation system bombings
2006 (Mar) Man drives vehicle into pedestrians injuring nine at the University of North Carolina
– Chapel Hill, NC
2006 (Jun) Al-Qaida in Iraq leader Abu Musab al-Zarqawi killed in Iraq
2006 (Aug) British foil alleged plot to detonate explosives on planes mid-flight to US
2009 (Jun) Army Private William Long killed and two others injured in a shooting attack at the
Army Navy Career Center, Little Rock, Arkansas.
2009 (Nov) MAJ Nidal Hassan kills thirteen and injures another 30 at the Fort Hood Soldier
Readiness Center in Ft. Hood, TX.
2009 (Dec) Yemini terrorist attempts to detonate a bomb on a flight from Amsterdam to Detroit
but the bomb only ignites; passengers and crew subdue the terrorist.
2011 (2 May) Osama Bin Laden killed in Pakistan by American military forces.
2012 (11 SEP) Attack on U. S. Consulate in Benghazi, which resulted in the death of
Ambassador Chris Stevens, and three other Americans.

This study will consist of a policy analysis aimed at identifying the critical elements from the
current strategy which may be utilized to combat the extremist threat our nation is facing.
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Purpose of the Study
The purpose of this thesis is to conduct a qualitative analysis of the sources of extremism
from two different perspectives (US government and local moderate Muslims), determine if The
National Intelligence Estimate 2007 properly identifies the sources of Islamic extremism, and
make recommendations on how to counter the sources of extremism/radicalization and improve
US security and counterterrorism strategy. The sample size for this study is small and far from
being representative of the United States as a whole, but is intended to be suggestive in nature
rather than probative. The research questions which will guide this study include a primary
research question and three secondary research questions.
Research Questions
The primary research question this thesis seeks to answer is:
1. What are the primary sources of Extremism?
In order to answer the primary question, secondary questions are needed to provide a complete
review of the topic. Secondary questions include:
2. What do the leading authors and so called “experts” say are the sources of extremism?
3. What do US government documents identify as the sources of extremism?
4. What does the local Moderate Muslim population identify as the sources/causes of
extremism?
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Limitations and Assumptions
This study assumes that the participants surveyed answered honestly. The sample
consists of members of a local Muslim community. However, in qualitative research,
assumptions may also constitute a limitation. This study cannot determine the absolute
truthfulness of the participants. Despite the assurance of confidentiality, the members of the
local community may alter their responses to avoid any perceived repercussions or negative
judgments that may result from the study. Identifying oneself as being anti-Israel or anti-Jewish
could invite attack from militant Jewish groups. Similarly, expressing antagonism towards
American policy could be perceived by some American zealots as being anti-American and as a
result lead to discrimination or anti-Islamic violence. Furthermore, generalizations of the
findings are limited because participants were selected from one particular Islamic Mosque in
Mississippi and because of the qualitative nature of the research. The findings should not be
deemed representative of the entire American Muslim community. Moreover, due to the lack of
research, it is difficult for this study to compliment previous research.
The methodology of this study utilizes a purposeful and convenient sample of
individuals. The sample of the local Muslim community will be used because they are easily
identifiable as members of the Muslim population and are easily accessible. This particular
method of sampling potentially includes biases and opinions that are not representative of the
larger Muslim population of the United States. Potential flaws and limitations are inherent in
particular instruments creating reason to be skeptical of the findings. However, the present
research is intended to serve as a basis for further research. This study will aim to explore the
perceptions of the participants because their opinion is important in the analysis of the current
national strategy. The collective opinion of the local Muslim community could also serve as a
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counter argument to the information provided in many of the literary sources which examine the
Islamic community and which have served as a literary background to this study.
The researcher attempted to mitigate the potential problems of the study by providing the
participants an Information Letter that detailed the researcher’s intention to protect
confidentiality and verifies voluntary participation. The researcher believes this will increase
honesty among the participants. The researcher also provided both open ended and closed ended
questions on the survey in order to ensure clarification and additional explanation opportunities
for the participants to elaborate on issues they feel were not addressed by the survey questions.
The additional comments provided by the participants were reviewed for reoccurring themes and
included in the final report of conclusions as additional areas to guide future research.
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Definition of Key Terms
Apostate. “One who has abandoned their religious faith, principles or cause.” (Johnson, 2007, p
6) This term is used to describe deserters from any religion.
Globalization. “Process of becoming worldwide in scope.” (Johnson, 2007, p 6)
Ideology. “A tightly knit body of beliefs organized around a few central values; examples
include communism, fascism, and variations of nationalism.” (Kilroy, 2007, p 212)
Irredentist Islamic extremist. “Subset of Islamic extremism; seeks to regain land ruled by nonMuslims or under occupation.” (Johnson, 2007, p 7)
Islamic extremism. “Individuals committed to restructuring political society in accordance with
their vision of Islamic law and willing to use violence to achieve their goals; three types:
irredentist, nationalist and transnational.” (Johnson, 2007, p 7)
Islamism. “Islamic activism; three types: political, missionary and extremist.” (Johnson, 2007, p
7)
Islamist. “Islamists are revolutionary in outlook, extremist in behavior, totalitarian in ambition.”
(Pipes, 2002, p 40)
Jihad. “Struggle; two types: individual internal struggle against evil and temptation, and holy
war waged by Muslims against infidels.” (Johnson, 2007, p 7) This is similar to the Christian
desire for piety and devotion.
Jihadist. “Muslim involved in a jihad (note: Islamic extremists often identify themselves as
jihadists).” (Johnson, 2007, p 7)
Militant Islam. A utopian ideology initiated in the twentieth century, that attracts only a portion
of Muslims (perhaps 10-15 percent), seeks to capture control of governments, and is nakedly
aggressive toward all those who stand in its way, no matter what their faith. (Pipes, 2002, p 3)
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Nationalist Islamic Extremist. “Subset of Islamic extremism; focus is on combating Muslim
governments considered impious or apostate.” (Johnson, 2007, p 7)
Terrorism. “Use or threat of use of seemingly random violence against non-traditional targets in
order to instill a climate of fear so that the fear will induce political acquiescence and/or a
political change in favor of those instigating the violence.” (Kilroy, 2007, p 164)
Transnational Islamic Extremist. “Subset of Islamic extremism; focus transcends national
boundaries; also called global terrorists or global jihadists.” (Johnson, 2007, p 7)

Summary
This thesis presents the findings of the researcher as well as relevant and available
literature. The study also examines the perceptions of the local Moderate Muslim population in
regards to the current government policies governing extremism and radicalization. The findings
of the survey will be analyzed and compared to the indicators of extremism and radicalization as
identified by the governmental policies and other independent research as found in the literature
review.
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CHAPTER 2
RESEARCH DESIGN AND METHODOLOGY
Introduction
The literature concerning Islamic extremism and radicalization is clear in expressing the
complexity of the problem and the severity of this unique threat to the United States. This study
contributes to the research by examining and describing the perceptions of the local Muslim
community and comparing their perspective of the problem with the perspective obtained from
the prominent literature and published governmental policies regarding extremism and
radicalization. This chapter includes discussion: (a) population and sample, (b) methodology, (c)
data collection and instrumentation, and (d) data analysis.
The purpose of this qualitative study will be to explore the perceptions of local moderate
Muslims and how they might differ from the perceptions obtained from prominent researchers,
published governmental policies, and self-proclaimed or self-evidenced extremists themselves.
The research questions which will guide this study are:
1. What are the primary sources of extremism?
2. What do the leading authors and so called “experts” say are the sources of extremism?
3. What do US government documents identify as the sources of extremism?
4. What does the local Muslim population identify as the sources/causes of
extremism?
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Population and Sample
For the analysis of the local Moderate Muslim population, this thesis studies the
responses to survey questions administered to members of the local Muslim community.
Data Collection and Instrumentation
This thesis uses qualitative analysis to answer the primary and secondary research
questions. Further, it also uses textual analysis (i.e., document studies) to compare and contrast
data from multiple perspectives. To facilitate data reduction, data display, and drawing of
conclusions, primary and secondary textual source materials will be grouped into three
categories:
1. Prominent authors / Leading subject matter experts in the field
2. US government documents
3. Local Muslim perceptions
All data has been collected by the researcher. The researcher has tried to remain
objective and refrain from influencing survey responses. Furthermore, the researcher has
remained passive and has contributed as little as possible to the responses obtained through the
distribution or administration of the survey. Qualitative data has also been obtained through
semi-structured interviews with the key leaders of the local Muslim community during the
course of this study. The population sample was chosen from a group of Muslims who regularly
attend the local Islamic mosque Friday afternoon prayer service.
All participating surveys consisted of a cross sectional survey and additional information
was obtained through one-on-one conversations with key leaders within the local Islamic
community. Specifically, key leaders of the Islamic community were helpful in helping edit the
questions contained within the survey to ensure that the sensitive nature of the survey questions
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would not offend members of the local Muslim community. Without the support of these key
leaders within the Muslim community, the survey would not have been able to be administered.
Indeed, even with the support of the Islamic leadership, a majority of the Islamic community
appeared to be reluctant to participate in the study. All participating individuals were asked the
same closed ended questions in order to obtain quantifiable and easily coded information with an
open ended section at the conclusion of the survey to capture any additional issues individuals
may wish to express that were not covered in the closed ended question portion of the individual
survey.
Data Analysis
This study assembles a body of primary and secondary source materials. The source
material will be divided into three groups: (1) Prominent leading authors in the field of study or
leading subject matter experts, (2) United States governmental policies and other governmental
supporting documents, (3) Results obtained through the analysis of surveys administered to local
moderate Muslims and key Islamic leaders within the local area, which make up the three
perspectives from which to compare and contrast data.
Initially, a copy of the research proposal was sent to the Institutional Review Board
(IRB) to review the intended research to ensure safety of the participants. The researcher also
provided the IRB with the purpose of the research, the intended sample, the methodology, and
the potential risks involved for the participants. Further, the IRB was provided with information
describing how confidentiality will be maintained and a copy of the Informed Consent Form
(later to be titled Information Letter) which was given to each individual prior to participating in
the study.
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Upon approval of the IRB, individual surveys and informal interviews were conducted.
Each survey was analyzed and examined for re-occurring themes. The researcher then identified
common themes which emerged from the data (surveys and interviews). Further, to ensure
consistency of analyzing the data, the findings were imported into a Microsoft Excel spreadsheet
that will enable the researcher to organize the survey results in order to identify patterns.
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CHAPTER 3
LITERATURE REVIEW
Introduction
Extremism continues to be an ever present threat to our nation’s security and the United
States must increase its efforts to diminish the ability of Jihadist groups such as Al-queda,
Hamas, and Hezbollah from recruiting new militant members in the U.S. who are willing to
attack their own nation. In order to prevent moderate Muslims from radicalizing, it is important
to involve senior leaders within the Muslim community. The U.S. must be careful not to alienate
or discriminate against the American Muslim community because they are the best eyes and ears
our nation has for identifying at-risk moderate Muslims recruited for Jihad. Local police forces
will need to be vigilant in practicing good community policing and also using intelligence
gathered from the senior Muslim leaders to help maintain good situational awareness of potential
Muslim fundamentalist groups that are hostile to the U.S. and might be forming within their local
communities. Without these vitally important relations with the American Muslim community,
the U.S. will continue to be subjected to extremist terrorist attacks. This chapter presents a
review of the literary sources used during this study and the different sources of extremism
proposed by each in order to answer the secondary research questions. Once this information
has been examined, the thesis should have a solid foundation and be better able to answer the
primary research question: What are the primary sources of extremism?
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Prominent Authors on Extremism
Bruce Hoffman provided a clear explanation of the unique challenges that extremist
terrorism presents to the U.S. when he identified three key differences between Islamic terrorism
and other secular forms of terrorism. First, Islamic extremists reject all contemporary ideologies
and see themselves as outsiders with no option but to resort to militant Jihad. Next, as Jihadists
fighting a holy war, total victory can only be obtained through the total destruction of the
enemies of Allah and a return to an Islamic state governed by the rule of Shariah. Finally,
Islamic extremists believe that to kill the enemies of Allah and to offer the infidels the choice
between converting to Islam or being put to death is the duty of every individual believer as well
as the task of the Islamic state. (Hoffman, 1993, pg. 4) With this view of the extremists’
religious dedication and willingness to die for one’s religious conviction, there is no easy end to
this ever increasing threat to U.S. security.
Daniel Pipes, in his book Militant Islam Reaches America, argued that although a large
percentage of the population (both Muslim and Christian) believe that militant Islam is a result
of economic stress and poverty, such an explanation must be ruled out and the real cause of
militant Islam must be found in some other variable. Mr. Pipes supported his argument by
examining the backgrounds of the nineteen suicide hijackers involved in the September 11th
attacks. The backgrounds of those terrorists included, “money, education, and privilege.” (Pipes,
2002, pg. xiv) Mr. Pipes goes on to further examine the life of John Walker Lindh who he
described as a “young son of privilege who joined the Taliban in Afghanistan and charged with
providing material support and resources to a foreign terrorist organization.” (Pipes, 2002, pg.
xvi) The author also addressed the difficult issue that governments have in formulating a policy
on what at first appears to be a religion. In order to help clarify the issue, Mr. Pipes drew a clear
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distinction between Islam, a religion, and militant Islam, a political ideology that he compared
with fascism and Marxism-Leninism. (Pipes, 2002, pg. 47) Mr. Pipes goes on to express that the
U.S. government has an important, but difficult task in, “severing the common association
Americans make between Islam and terrorism. Officialdom does not deny that seemingly devout
Muslims are constantly trying to kill Americans, but it vociferously denies their connection to
Islam.” (Pipes, 2002, pg. 95)
The determination of the extremist is further expressed by a number of Shi’a
theologians. For example, Ayatollah Baqer al-Sadr wrote, “We have two choices: either to
accept it with submission, which means letting Islam die, or destroy it, so that we can construct
the world as Islam requires.” (Hoffman, 1993, pg. 5) Perhaps the most alarming message of the
extremist’s intent was expressed by Hussein Mussawi, the former leader of Lebanon’s
Hezbollah, when he stated, “We are not fighting so that the enemy recognizes us and offers us
something. We are fighting to wipe out the enemy.” (Hoffman, 1993, pg. 5) This devout
determination in the pursuit of their goal causes the extremist to be the most deadly and difficult
threat to guard against and defeat. The issue was best explained by Mr. Bruce Hoffman when he
stated,
“The volatile combination of religion and terrorism has been cited as
one of the main reasons for terrorism’s increased lethality. The fact
that for the religious terrorist violence inevitably assumes a transcendent
purpose and therefore becomes a sacramental or divine duty arguably
results in a significant loosening of the constraints on the commission
of mass murder. Religion, moreover, functions as a legitimizing force,
sanctioning if not encouraging wide scale violence against an almost openended category of opponents.” (Hoffman, 1993, pg. 12)
In short, the goal of an Islamist is not to achieve an acceptable coexistence with the enemy, but
the complete and utter annihilation of the enemy.
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Mark A. Gabriel’s book, Islam and Terrorism, portrays the Islamic faith, and more
specifically the Islamic view of Jihad, as only a former cleric and professor of Islamic History
can. Dr. Gabriel offers valuable insight into not only the Islamic religion, but also the Muslim
culture in an attempt to explain the motives and goals of Islamic extremist groups. Furthermore,
Dr. Gabriel’s experience as both a professor of Islamic history and an Imam of a local mosque
(similar to a pastor of a Christian Church) gives a unique and personal account of the struggles
he had with trying to reconcile the loving, peaceful, forgiving, and compassionate Islam that he
was instructed to teach with the “true” Islam that he was familiar with from his study of the
Quran. (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 2-4) During a Friday Islamic teaching at a local mosque in Giza,
Egypt to a group of about two hundred and fifty Muslims, Dr Gabriel delivered the following
message,
“Jihad in Islam is defending the Islamic nation and Islam against
the attacks of the enemies. Islam is a religion of peace and only
will fight against one who fights it. These infidels, heathens,
perverts, Christians and Allah’s grievers, the Jews, out of envy
of peaceful Islam and its prophet – they spread the myth that Islam
is promulgated by the sword and violence. These infidels, the
accusers of Islam, do not acknowledge Allah’s words.”
(Gabriel, 2002, pg. 1)

This message caused an internal conflict within Dr. Gabirel because he had studied the
Quran for years at Al-Azhar University and was instructed to focus on the politically correct
Islam and purposely overlook the areas of Islamic teaching that conflicted with the authority of
Egypt. (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 2) This “politically correct” version of Islam did not coincide with
the Islam he had studied. What confused him most was that while he was being instructed to
teach a politically correct version of Islam, Muslim fundamentalists, who were practicing true
Islam, were bombing churches and killing Christians. Dr. Gabriel goes on to claim,
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“Allah, the god revealed in the Quran, is not a loving father. It says that
he desires to lead people astray (Surah 6:39, 126). He does not help
those who are led astray by him (Surah 30:29) and desires to use them to
populate hell (Surah 32:13) Islam is full of discrimination – against women,
against non-Muslims, against Christians, and most especially against Jews.
Hatred is built into the religion.” (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 5)

As Dr. Gabriel struggled to understand the reasons for the two separate messages, he
questioned a well-known Islamic cleric, Omar Abdel Rahman (the spiritual leader of the radical
Egyptian group al-Jihad which carried out the assassination of Egyptian President Anwar Sadat),
about the verses in the Quran that talk about love, peace, and forgiveness. Omar Abdel Rahman
replied, “there is a whole surah (chapter) called ‘Spoils of War.’ There is no surah called
‘Peace.’ Jihad and killing are the head of Islam. If you take them out, you cut off the head of
Islam.” (Gabriel, 2002. pg. 24)
Dr. Gabriel explains to his reader that Islam is a religion of works. That is, entrance into
Paradise (Heaven) must be earned. According to the Islamic faith, when judgment day comes,
Allah weighs the good works and the bad works in order to determine their fate. “Then as for
him whose balance (of good deeds) will be heavy, he will live a pleasant life (in Paradise). But
as for him whose balance (of good deeds) be light, he will have his home in Hawiyah (pit, i.e.,
Hell)” – Surah 101:6-9. (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 27) This differs significantly from the Christian faith
where one receives salvation through the acceptance of Jesus Christ and cannot earn God’s grace
through works or deeds, but rather through faith. This fundamental difference is key to
understanding a Muslim’s willingness to fight Jihad or, more specifically, accept a suicide
mission that will certainly result in his/her death. Dr. Gabriel explains, “the only way for a
Muslim to ensure that he will get into Paradise is to die in Jihad – to die while fighting the
enemy of Islam.” (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 28) Jihad is further explained as fighting anybody who
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stands in the way of spreading Islam or fighting anyone who refuses to enter (submit) to Islam
(based on Surah 8:39) (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 28)
The question still remains, “What about the Quranic verses that speak of love, peace, and
forgiveness?” Dr. Gabriel responds to this question by explaining to the reader the Islamic
concept of “Nasikh.” The principle of Nasikh is based on the fact that the Quran was revealed to
Muhammad at different times throughout his life. Over a period of about twenty-two years, the
prophet Muhammad traveled from Mecca to Medina and the Quran is a result of the revelations
he received during this time period. The prophet Muhammad had a significantly different
experience in Mecca than he did while he was in Medina. Muhammad’s life in Mecca was all
about prayers and meditation. Therefore, the Quranic verses written while Muhammad was in
Mecca are about peace and cooperation with others. While in Medina, Muhammad became a
military leader and invader. Therefore, the revelations in Medina talk about military power and
invasion in the name of Islam (Jihad). (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 31) The earlier, more peaceful and
loving verses of the Quran which were written while the prophet was in Mecca, were superseded
by more violent and militant verses which were written while Muhammad was in Medina. The
process of replacing the older verses with the more recent ones is known as the principle of
Nasikh.
Dr. Gabriel goes on to clarify for the reader that the ultimate goal of Islam is Jihad. Jihad
is carried out in order to establish Islamic authority over the whole world. Dr. Gabriel further
explains that Islam is not just a religion, it is a government as well. (Gabriel, 2002 pg. 37) With
this as the ultimate goal of Islam, one has to ask, “Why then are not all Muslims fighting this
Jihad?” Dr. Gabriel offers an explanation for this question by identifying three types of
Muslims: Secular Muslims, Traditional Muslims, and Fundamentalist Muslims. Dr. Gabriel

24

describes the secular Muslims by stating that they “believe in the nice parts of Islam, but reject
the call of Jihad. They take on the cultural trappings of the message, but they are not living it out
completely.” Dr. Gabriel describes the Traditional Muslims as those who “study, believe, and
practice Islam, but consider Jihad to be a spiritual battle or simply do not take action because
they do not have the ability, they are concerned with their families, or they want to live a nice
life on earth instead of dying.” Finally, Dr. Gabriel describes the Fundamentalist Muslims as the
Muslim extremists who perpetrate terrorism and their goal is, “to practice Islam as Muhammad
did; they are practicing ‘true’ Islam.” (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 39)
Certain key verses from the Quran help to identify and demonstrate the violent nature of
Islamic Jihad. For example, Surah 9:5 states:
“Fight and slay the Pagans wherever you find them,
and seize them,
beleaguer them, and lie in wait for them in every stratagem (of war);
but if they repent, and establish regular prayers and practice regular
charity, then open the way for them: for Allah is Oft-forgiving,
Most Merciful.” (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 30)

Other verses from the Quran that demonstrate this violent aspect of the Islamic faith
include Surah 4:89 which proclaims, “Those who reject Islam must be killed. If they turn back
(from Islam), take (hold of) them and kill them wherever you find them…” (Gabriel, 2002, pg.
33) Another verse which offers proof of violence in the Quran is Surah 8:59-60 which
emphasizes, “Against them make ready your strength to the utmost of your power, including
steeds of war, to strike terror into (the hearts of) the enemies, of Allah and your enemies, and
others besides, whom you may not know, but whom Allah knows.” (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 34) It is
interesting that this particular verse contains a clear reference to the intent of Islamic Jihad to
“strike terror into the hearts of the enemies.” This pattern of violent scripture is seen again in
Surah 8:39 which states, “And fight them until there is no more Fitnah (disbelief and polytheism,

25

i.e., worshiping others besides Allah) and the religion (worship) will be for Allah Alone [in the
whole of the world]. But if they cease (worshipping others besides Allah), then certainly, Allah
is All-Seer of what they do.” (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 35) Finally, Muhammad’s instructions for
waging Jihad and against whom this holy war should be directed are clearly found in Surah 9:29:
“Fight against those who (1) believe not in Allah, (2) nor in the last day,
(3) nor forbid that which has been forbidden by Allah and His Messenger
(Muhammad) (4) and those who acknowledge not the religion of truth
(i.e. Islam) among the people of the Scripture (Jews and Christians), until
they pay the Jizyah [tax] with willing submission, and feel themselves
subdued. (Gabriel, 2002, pg. 73)

These versus from the Quran provide very clear evidence of the violent nature of the
Islamic faith and are intended to prove to the reader the inherent dangers of Islamic Jihad.
However, are these passages significantly different from verses found in the Christian Holy
Bible?
The King James Version of the Holy Bible also contains similar scriptures of a wrathful
and jealous God which seem to command violent action against the enemies of the faith. For
example, 2 Samuel 22:35; 38-41 reads:
“He teacheth my hands to war; so that a bow of steel is broken by mine
arms….I have pursued my enemies, and destroyed them; and turned not
again until I had consumed them. And I have consumed them, and
wounded them, that they could not arise: yea, they are fallen under my
feet. For thou hast girded me with strength to battle: them that rose up
against me hast thou subdued under me. Thou hast also given me the
necks of mine enemies, that I might destroy them that hate me.”
(KJV, 1988, pg. 439-440)

This passage is repeated in the book of Psalms 18:34-40. Elsewhere in the Old
Testament similar scriptures are found, such as Exodus 15:3 which proclaims, “The Lord is a
man of war: the Lord is his name.” Other similar passages which refer to war against the
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enemies of Israel and the complete destruction of its adversaries include Joshua 6:21, “And they
utterly destroyed all that was in the city, both man and woman, young and old, and ox, and
sheep, and ass, with the edge of the sword.” The book of Deuteronomy echoes this theme in
versus 13:15-16 and in 20:13-16. These passages are very similar to the violent messages
previously mentioned from the Quran. In fact, some might argue that these versus could easily
be interpreted as a “Christian” call to “Jihad.” With these similarities between the Holy Bible
and the Islamic Quran, how is it that Christians are not involved in a “holy war” against the
Muslims of the world? The answer is quite simple. Just as the Islamic faith has the principle of
Nasikh, where older versus are superseded by more recent scripture, the Holy Bible and
Christian followers understand the difference between Old Testament and New Testament
passages. All of the previous examples of Biblical scripture are found in the Old Testament
where the culture of Israel had to fight for its survival against numerous enemies. The clear
distinction between Islam and Christianity is that Islam seems to migrate from a peaceful
religion to a more violent and militant lifestyle, whereas Christianity evolves from a violent past
to a peaceful, loving, and forgiving religion with the arrival of the ministry of Jesus Christ and
the New Testament.
Similarities can also be observed between Islamic and Jewish terrorism. A clear example
of Jewish terrorist acts include Baruch Goldstein’s assault on Ibrahim’s mosque on 25 February
1994, during the second Muslim Sabbath and Islam’s holy month of Ramadan, killing 29 and
wounding 150. (Howard, Sawyer, Bajema, 2009, pg. 209) Another example of Jewish terrorism
is the assassination of Prime Minister Yitzhak Rabin by Yigal Amir, a young Jewish student,
who claimed he had acted on orders of God. (Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 209) In fact, there are
many similarities between the stands of the Jewish Kach and the Islamic Hamas organizations.
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These similarities include: Both share a vision of a religious state between the Jordon River and
the Mediterranean Sea; both have a “xenophobia” against everything alien or secular which must
be removed from the entire land (purification of the land of all things foreign or secular); both
have a vehement rejection of western culture; and both rely not only on violence, but also a
gradual building of an impressive constituency through a strategy of “re-Islamization” or “reJudaization” from below. (Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 214)
Dr. Gabriel’s argument of a violent Islamic faith which calls for/demands an offensive
Jihad is contrary to Magnus Ranstorp’s idea of Islam’s Jihad as a defensive doctrine. Whereas
Dr. Gabriel describes an offensive Jihad aimed at the total destruction of non-Muslim states and
world domination as its goal, Ranstorp argues that modern day Muslims are acting out of a sense
of fear and feel threatened by the encroachment of western influence and secular governments of
Christian societies, such as the U.S., into predominately Muslim lands. Ranstorp expressed this
fear best when he claimed,
“The accelerated dissolution of traditional links of social and cultural
cohesion within and between societies with the current globalization
process, combined with the historical legacy and current conditions of
political repression, economic inequality and social upheaval common
among disparate religious extremist movements, have all led to an
increased sense of fragility, instability, and unpredictability for the
present and the future.” (Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 211)

Ranstorp further explains that not only do Islamic terrorists feel the need to preserve their
religious and cultural identity, they also see this time as an opportunity to fundamentally shape
the future. (Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 211) Ranstorp continues to develop the “crisis mentality”
in the Islamic terrorist’s mindset by describing the problem as being “multi-faceted.” He claims
that the Islamic terrorist is being affected in several areas, including the social, political,
economic, cultural, psychological, and spiritual sphere. This combination of influencers results
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in a sense of “spiritual fragmentation and radicalization of society and the extremist’s fear of the
forced march toward one worldism.” (Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 211) Ranstorp further argues that
Islam’s Jihad is essentially a defensive doctrine which is somewhat contrary to what Dr. Gabriel
presents in his book, Islam and Terrorism. Ranstorp discusses Islam’s Jihad, which is
sanctioned by leading Muslim theologians, as a fight against perceived aggressors, tyrants, and
“wayward Muslims.” Ranstorp goes on to explain that in its most violent form, Jihad is
“justified as a means of last resort to prevent the extinction of the distinctive identity of the
Islamic community against the forces of secularism and modernism.” (Howard, et al, 2009, pg.
212) Ranstorp seems to differ with Dr. Gabriel’s assessment of the intention of Islamic Jihad by
suggesting that the goal of Islamic extremists is not the establishment of a global Islamic state
ruled by Quranic Muslim Law, but instead as a defensive struggle against the secular and
cultural invasion of the western culture and Christian influence. Ranstorp supports this theory
when he states,
“With the loss of Palestine to Zionism, Islamic extremists drew heavily
on the symbolism and history of the crusades where Christianity was
pitted against Islam to explain their current condition of oppression and
disinheritance, and to provide a workable solution and defense against
the threat of western encirclement and secularization.”
(Howard, et al, 2009, pg. 217)
These two theories of the goal of Islamic Jihad are both credible and well supported by
the two authors. The question remains, “What is the true goal of Islamic Jihad?” Is it an
offensive holy war aimed at the establishment of a global Islamic state where Islamic law
governs supreme? Or is it a defensive battle to protect the Islamic culture from the perceived
invasion of the west and the secularization which threatens the traditional Muslim culture and
Islamic way of life? The goal of Islamic Jihad is quite simply…both. Islamic extremists are
concerned with protecting the heart and soul of the Islamic faith from what they perceive as an
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external threat to their culture and way of life. This is the immediate short term goal of the
current Islamic Jihad we are seeing today. The long term, or ultimate, goal of Jihad is the
establishment of an Islamic state governed by the law prescribed within the Quran. Within this
Islamic state, there is no room for secular government or independent nation states. These two
viewpoints of Islamic Jihad are both mutually supportive and offer a comprehensive
understanding of Islam and terrorism.
Monte Palmer and Princess Palmer also discuss the causes, diversity and challenges of
dealing with extremism in their book, Islamic Extremism. In the first chapter of the book, the
Palmers begin by trying to define the enemy in America’s struggle against terrorism. The
authors are quick to make the distinction that, “The jihadists might be Muslim, but few Muslims
are jihadists”. The authors also make a familiar statement when they point out that, “The
American government denies that it is at war with Islam, but the world’s Muslims remain
unconvinced.” (Palmer, 2008, pg. 2) The chapter goes on to state, “The Muslim world is
acutely sensitive about threats to its faith regardless of their intent. Attacks on Islam, however
inadvertent, strengthen the forces of Islamic extremism.” (Palmer, 2008, pg. 4) The Palmers
continue to discuss the modern perception of the world’s Muslim community when it provided
the following information in Chapter 2,
“A Times of London poll conducted shortly after September 11 found that
approximately 11 percent of Britain’s two million Muslims believed that
there was some justification for Bin Laden’s attacks on the United States;
some 40 percent of the respondents disagreed with Bin Laden’s means but
agreed that his war against the United States was justified. Sixty-eight
percent indicated that their faith was more important than “being British.”
The results were based on interviews with 1,170 Muslims conducted
outside British mosques.” (Palmer, 2008, pg. 23)
The discussion on the British Muslim perceptions continued with a proposed cause for
extremism and the emergence of terrorist cells. Most of the research that was conducted on
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causes for extremism resulted from, “Hostility toward the United States focused on American
policy in the Middle East and particularly U.S. support of Israel.” (Palmer, 2008, pg. 23) This
argument has been a reoccurring theme in most books published about modern terrorism and
must be considered as an answer to one of the secondary research questions, “What do the
leading authors identify as the sources of extremism?” To make matters worse, American efforts
to “win the hearts and minds” of the Muslim community have failed miserably and in much of
the world America (or at least the American government) is seen as the “bad guys” and jihadists
are viewed as “freedom fighters”. (Palmer, 2008, pg. 24) It is ironic that the U.S., which claims
to be the beacon of Freedom and Liberty, is being attacked by extremists who view themselves
as “Freedom fighters” trying to liberate their countries from American military occupation. This
issue is best illustrated when the book states:
“Americans see themselves as a fair and reasonable people who desire
nothing more than freedom, justice, and prosperity for all. As the innocent
victims of criminal violence, Americans believe that they are justified in
striking the terrorists with maximum force. In their view, their hands are
free of blood. The image of the United States that prevails in the Islamic
world is radically different. Not only is the United States seen as having
blood on its hands, but those hands are literally dripping in the blood of
Arabs and Muslims.” (Palmer, 2008, pg. 28-29)
The authors conclude their discussion on the world’s Muslim perceptions of the United
States by stating, “The United States will not be successful in countering terrorism and Islamic
extremism unless it can do a better job of convincing people that America has not declared war
on Islam. It would also do well to reconsider its support of oppressive regimes in the Islamic
world. All fuel anti-Americanism and anti-Americanism strengthens the jihadists. (Palmer,
2008, pg. 31)
The question of how we are to deal with extremism remains. According to Philip
Heymann in his book, Terrorism and America, there are three primary concerns for democratic
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nations dealing with terrorism: the preservation of life, the preservation of liberties necessary to
a vibrant society, and the maintaining of the unity of society. (Heymann, 1988, p. iv) It was
interesting to note that Mr. Heymann did not list the destruction of the terrorist organization
within his primary concerns. In fact, Mr. Heymann went on to argue that Prime Minister
Benjamin Netanyahu’s goal of, “Dealing with terrorism as unitary – the destruction of a deeply
evil activity and those who practice it – and who see the primary means to that destruction as
simply unleashing the security forces of a powerful state” is not the correct course of action to
take. (Heymann, 1988, p. x) Mr. Heymann argued that terrorist organizations must be
confronted on a political battlefield as well as incorporating a military or police action response.
This argument further supported the using of civic engagements and establishing a strong
cooperative relationship with senior leaders within the local Muslim communities.
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Governmental Documents
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America, March 2006 (NSS) states
that, “The War on Terror has been both a battle of arms and a battle of ideas – a fight against the
terrorists and against their murderous ideology.” (NSS, 2006, pg. 9) This governmental
document goes on to clarify that:
“While the War on Terror is a battle of ideas, it is not a battle of religions.
The transnational terrorists confronting us today exploit the proud religion
of Islam to serve a violent political vision: the establishment, by terrorism
and subversion, of a totalitarian empire that denies all political and religious
freedom. These terrorists distort the idea of Jihad into a call for murder
against those they regard as apostates or unbelievers – including Christians,
Jews, Hindus, other religious traditions, and all Muslims who disagree with
them. Indeed, most of the terrorist attacks since September 11 have occurred
in Muslim countries – and most of the victims have been Muslims.” (NSS, 2006, pg. 9)
It is important to note that the National Security Strategy of 2006 stresses that the U.S. is NOT
in a War against the religion of Islam. Unfortunately, many of the World’s Muslims do not
agree. Extremist groups use the U.S. recent Foreign Policy decisions, our long history of
supporting Israel, and our military involvement in the Islamic countries of Iraq and Afghanistan
to argue that the U.S. IS at war with Islam. This is a huge problem that this country will have to
address if there is any hope in winning the war on terror.
The NSS of 2006 also identifies the causes of terrorism and extremism while also
identifying what does not cause individuals to join extremist organizations. First, the NSS
discusses four commonly proposed sources of terrorism:
1. The inevitable by-product of poverty
2. A result of hostility to U.S. policy in Iraq
3. A result of Israeli-Palestinian issues
4. A response to our efforts to prevent terror attacks
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These four “sources” of terrorism are commonly expressed as possible causes for the extremism,
but the NSS of 2006 offers fairly compelling evidence that these are NOT part of the root cause
of terrorism. The report argues that because many of the hijackers responsible for the September
11 attacks were from middle-class families, their decision to follow an extremist ideology could
not be a product of poverty. The report also reminds the reader that the leader of Al-Qa’ida,
Osama Bin Laden, came from a privileged upbringing which further demonstrates that poverty
does not lead to extremism. The NSS of 2006 continues to point out that the U.S. has been at
war with terror long before the war in Iraq and Saddam Hussein. A brief look at our nation’s
recent history with terrorism will indicate that terrorism existed long before our hostility in Iraq
and therefore our military action in Iraq is not a cause of extremism (although our continued
military involvement in Muslim nations may provide extremist groups a source for recruiting
young Muslims to participate in a defense of Islamic Holy land). While extremism pre-existed
the Iraq War (and our support of the Shah of Iran), these events continue to be a cause of present
and future recruiting for extremist organizations.
Next, the National Security Strategy of 2006 addresses the possibility of extremism as
being a result of the never-ending Israeli-Palestinian conflict. The report does not go into much
detail on this argument and only provides a short one sentence answer to this potential cause of
extremism. The report states, “Al-Qaida plotting for the September 11 attacks began in the
1990’s, during an active period in the peace process.” (NSS, 2006, pg. 10) This is not sufficient
evidence to discount the Israeli-Palestinian issue with the rise of extremism. The issue of the
Israeli-Palestinian conflict is addressed in several prominent authors’ books as a leading cause of
extremism and it is also echoed in the survey results that will be analyzed later in this study.
The NSS of 2006 concludes its discussion of false causes of extremism by addressing the
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argument that extremism is simply a response to our efforts to prevent terrorist attacks. Here
again, the report uses a historic timeline to refute this cause and effect argument. The report
states, “The al-Qaida network targeted the United States long before the United States targeted
al-Qaida. Indeed, the terrorists are emboldened more by perceptions of weakness than by
demonstrations of resolve. Terrorists lure recruits by telling them that we are decadent and
easily intimidated and will retreat if attacked.” (NSS, 2006, pg. 10) This answer also demands
further discussion. Extremists would, no doubt, argue that the United States was responsible for
“targeting” Islamic nations by engaging in a military occupation of the Muslim Holy lands.
The NSS of 2006 does provide four alternative origins for the radicalization of an
otherwise peaceful religion:
1. Political alienation
2. Grievances that can be blamed on others
3. Sub-cultures of conspiracy and misinformation
4. An ideology that justifies murder
The first cause, political alienation, argues that extremists are recruited from populations which,
“Have no voice in their own government and see no legitimate way to promote change in their
own country.” (NSS, 2006, pg. 10) The report states that this poor political environment causes
the people of these countries to be vulnerable to manipulation by extremist groups and their
violent ideology which advocates political change through violence and destruction.
The second cause, grievances that can be blamed on others, claims that, “The failures of
the terrorists feel and see are blamed on others, and on perceived injustices from the recent or
sometimes distant past. The terrorists’ rhetoric keeps wounds associated with this past fresh and
raw, a potent motivation for revenge and terror.” (NSS, 2006, pg. 10) This argument tends to
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blame extremists for “living in the past” and acting out of an emotional response to “perceived
injustices.”
Next, the 2006 NSS claims that extremism stems from sub-cultures of conspiracy and
misinformation. Here again, the report claims that extremist groups are made up of populations
whose world view is, “Contaminated by falsehoods and corrupted by conspiracy theories.”
(NSS, 2006, pg. 10) Basically, the report argues that extremist groups ignore facts that would
challenge their prejuditial outlook and refuse to see things for how they are, but instead prefer to
focus on popular self-serving propaganda and see the world as they wish to see it.
The final cause that the 2006 NSS claims contributes to extremism is an ideology that
justifies murder. The report argues that, “Terrorism ultimately depends upon the appeal of an
ideology that excuses or even glorifies the deliberate killing of innocents. A proud religion – the
religion of Islam – has been twisted and made to serve an evil end, as in other times and places
other religions have been similarly abused.” (NSS, 2006, pg. 10) This last cause for extremism
focuses directly on the ability of the extremists to justify their violent actions with their religious
views. In order for a Muslim to condone suicide attacks and the targeting of a civilian
population, he/she must ascribe to an extremist ideology. Most Muslim communities and
religious leaders would argue that anyone who accepts this extremist ideology is not a true
Muslim; conversely, an extremist would argue that any Muslim who refuses to support the
current Jihad or defense of Islam is not a true Muslim. Therefore, a primary issue within the
Muslim community seems to be the question of whether or not a jihad has been declared against
the U.S. and if so, whether or not they should answer the call if indeed the religion of Islam is at
war with the U.S. The final question to be considered by the Islamic community is if a Jihad has
been declared, what are a Muslim’s “Rules of Engagement?” Even if a Muslim is engaged in
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military action in the defense of Islam, many Muslims would argue that the targeting and killing
of civilians is not supported by the teachings of the Koran or Muhammad (Peace Be Upon Him).
This would also be an important religious topic for future discussion and study.
This 2006 National Security Strategy therefore provides the answer to one of our
secondary research questions by providing what the government views as the causes of
extremism. The 2006 NSS argues that democracy and a well-established government will help
solve these problems. As the document states, “Transnational terrorists are recruited from
people who have no voice in their own government and see no legitimate way to promote change
in their own country. Without a stake in the existing order, they are vulnerable to manipulation
by those who advocate a perverse vision based on violence and destruction.” (NSS, 2006, pg.
10)
Once the causes of terrorism and extremism were identified, the NSS then communicated
a strategy for combating these issues. According to the 2006 NSS, the key to defeating the
extremists rests on the leaders of the Islamic faith.
“The strategy to counter the lies behind the terrorists’ ideology is to empower
the very people the terrorists most want to exploit: the faithful followers of Islam.
We will continue to support political reforms that empower peaceful Muslims
to practice and interpret their faith. The most vital work will be done within the
Islamic world itself, and Jordon, Morocco, and Indonesia have begun to make
important strides in this effort. Responsible Islamic leaders need to denounce
an ideology that distorts and exploits Islam for destructive ends and defiles a
proud religion.” (NSS, 2006, pg. 11)
The National Security Strategy of the United States of America closes with a vision statement
for the way forward, “The struggle against militant Islamic radicalization is the great ideological
conflict of the early years of the 21st century and finds the great powers all on the same side –
opposing the terrorists.” (NSS, 2006, pg. 36)
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A second governmental document, the National Intelligence Estimate, July 2007 (NIE)
specifically addresses the terrorist threat to the US homeland. The NIE of 2007 anticipated a
“persistent and evolving terrorist threat” with the main threat coming from “Islamic terrorist
cells, especially Al-Qa’ida, driven by their undiminished intent to attack the homeland.” (NIE,
2007) The report continues by stating that Al-Qa’ida will remain the most serious threat to our
nation’s security and it’s central leadership will continue to plan high impact attacks while
encouraging other extremist Sunni communities to do the same. The 2007 NIE also provides a
frightening picture of our current security situation when it states, “Although we have discovered
only a handful of individuals in the United States with ties to Al-Qa’ida senior leadership since
9/11, we judge that Al-Qa’ida will intensify its efforts to put operatives here.” (NIE, 2007) This
statement indicates that there are already foreign extremists operating within our borders and
already established within our communities. How many more have entered the country since the
2007 NIE was published?
The 2007 NIE also assesses that the Lebanese Hezbollah will continue to threaten
homeland security, especially if the group perceives the U.S. as posing a direct threat to Iran.
Finally, the 2007 NIE concludes by stating,
“We assess that the spread of radical – especially Salafi – internet sites,
increasingly aggressive anti-US rhetoric and actions, and the growing number
of radical, self-generating cells in Western countries indicate that the radical
and violent segment of the West’s Muslim population is expanding, including
in the United States. The arrest and prosecution by US law enforcement of a
small number of violent Islamic extremists inside the United States – who are
becoming more connected ideologically, virtually, and/or in a physical sense
to the global extremist movement – points to the possibility that others may
become sufficiently radicalized that they will view the use of violence here
as legitimate.” (NIE, 2007)
This closing statement clearly identifies the issue of “radicalization” of moderate Muslims to a
more extremist view or ideology as a persistent threat to the U.S. homeland security. The threat
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discussed here is an “internal” issue that suggests that American Muslims could be at risk of
converting to a more militant strain or radical ideology of Islam. Here again it is important to
acknowledge the importance of the key leadership of the Islamic community in preventing a
distorted view of Islam and protecting the Islamic youth from being swayed to a violent ideology
or perversion of the Islamic faith. Government intrusion into the Islamic faith will not help
prevent radicalization; in fact, government intrusion can only be seen as a threat to American
Muslim’s freedom of religion. The U.S. government must trust the Islamic leaders to police
their own community.
Finally, the last governmental document that is included in the Literature Review is the
National Security Strategy published in May 2010 (NSS, 2010). The National Security Strategy
of 2010 is very different from the NSS published just four years earlier (NSS, 2006). While the
2006 NSS described our current war on terror as a “battle of ideas, not a battle of religion,”
discussed the four causes of extremism, and closed by stating our current struggle against
“militant Islamic radicalization” was the great conflict of the 21st century, the NSS of 2010 goes
one step further by not mentioning the words, “radicalization”, “Muslim”, or “Islam” even once
in the entire 52 page document. The 2010 NSS identified Weapons of Mass destruction as the
primary threat to the security of the U.S. where the 2006 NSS stated that terrorists and their
murderous ideology presented the greatest threat. The 2010 NSS also spends a great deal of time
discussing the importance of the economy, environment (climate change), and our countries
dependence on fossil fuel. The 2010 NSS only briefly mentions “extremism” when it states,
“We must focus American engagement on strengthening international institutions
and galvanizing the collective action that can serve common interests such as
combating violent extremism; stopping the spread of nuclear weapons and securing
nuclear materials; achieving balanced and sustainable economic growth; and forging
cooperative solutions to the threat of climate change, armed conflict, and pandemic
disease.” (NSS, 2010, pg. 3)
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The 2010 NSS also acknowledges a commitment to reach a compromise in the Israeli-Palestinian
conflict by stating,
“We will be unwavering in our pursuit of a comprehensive peace between Israel
and its neighbors, including a two-state solution that ensures Israel’s security,
while fulfilling the Palestinian peoples’ legitimate aspirations for a viable state
of their own. And our broader engagement with Muslim communities around
the world will spur progress on critical political and security matters, while
advancing partnerships on a broad range of issues based on mutual interests
and mutual respect.” (NSS, 2010, pg. 4)

This new position of compromise may be received by the Islamic nations as a commitment by
the United States to pursue a peaceful solution to the extremist problem and a willingness to
work with extremist groups such as Hamas and Hezbollah to find common ground and declare a
truce, but it may also be viewed as a weakening of our resolve. The 2010 NSS goes on to
discuss our ongoing effort to fight terrorism by stating,
“The United States is now fighting two wars with many thousands of our men and
women deployed in harm’s way, and hundreds of billions of dollars dedicated to funding these
conflicts. In Iraq, we are supporting a transition of responsibility to the sovereign Iraqi
Government. We are supporting the security and prosperity of our partners in Afghanistan and
Pakistan as part of a broader campaign to disrupt, dismantle, and defeat al-Qa’ida and its violent
extremist affiliates. Yet these wars – and our global efforts to successfully counter violent
extremism – are only one element of our strategic environment and cannot define America’s
engagement with the world. Terrorism is one of many threats that are more consequential in a
global age.” (NSS, 2010, pg. 8)
There is no mistaking the difference in tone between the 2006 and 2010 National
Security Strategies published only four years apart. Indeed, the 2010 NSS seems to be more
concerned with the state of the nation’s economy, environmental issues such as climate change,
and our dependence on fossil fuels than it does with terrorism.
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Summary of Literature Review
Extremism continues to be an ever present threat to our nation’s security and the U.S.
must increase its efforts to diminish the ability of Jihadist groups such as Al-queda, Hamas, and
Hezbollah from recruiting new militant members willing to attack their own nation. Mr.
Hoffman provided a clear description of the unique problem extremism presents to the U.S. Mr.
Hoffman explained how the extremists’ rejection of contemporary ideologies leaves them with
no option other than militant Jihad. Mr. Hoffman also indicated that for these extremists, total
victory can only be obtained through the total destruction of the enemies of Allah and a return to
an Islamic state governed by the rule of Shariah. Finally, he argued that extremists believe that
the destruction of the enemies of Allah is the duty of every individual believer as well as the task
of the Islamic state. This unique threat was supported further by Ayatollah Baqer al-Sadr when
he expressed that Muslims had only two choices: to allow Islam to perish or destroy the western
influence which threatens Islam. Perhaps the most alarming message of the extremist’s intent
was expressed by Hussein Mussawi when he stated, “We are not fighting so that the enemy
recognizes us and offers us something. We are fighting to wipe out the enemy.” Dr. Gabriel
also offered a different perspective by discussing the issue from a former Islamic Cleric’s
perspective. Dr. Gabriel identified the inherent violence within the Koran and argued that the
roots of terrorism have been at the core of Islam since the prophet Muhammad received the first
verses of the Koran in about 610 A.D. (Gabriel, 2002, p. x) Finally, Mr. Heymann argued that
terrorist organizations must be confronted on a political battlefield as well as incorporating a
military or police action response. Mr. Heymann’s argument suggested using more civic
engagement activities and establishing stronger cooperative relationships within the local
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Muslim communities in order to facilitate a better understanding of the root causes of extremism
and radicalization.
This chapter has presented a review of what has been written about the subject of
extremism and has highlighted the sources identified by various leading authors and
governmental documents. To further the understanding of extremism, this study will explore the
perceptions of local moderate Muslims regarding the current governmental policies and opinions
of the “so called experts” surrounding the issue of extremism and the process of radicalization.
Once the participants were identified and agreed to participate in the study, each individual
completed a survey which attempted to assess the attitudes and concerns of the local Muslim
community in comparison with the expressed concerns of the governmental policy. The survey
consists of mostly multiple choice questions which ask the individual to rate how strongly they
agree or disagree with certain expressed concerns from the governmental policies and will also
contain a short open ended portion where participants will be asked to add any comments or
concerns they have regarding the issue of extremism and the radicalization issue that was not
addressed by the questions contained within the survey. A copy of the survey and data results is
provided in Appendix A of this thesis. The collected data should help reveal the perceptions of
the local moderate Muslim community as well as additional concerns not specifically addressed
by the survey. Chapter 4 will discuss the difficulties this researcher faced while attempting to
conduct this study as well as a summary of the survey results and how they compare to the
governmental documents and subject matter experts discussed in the Literature review.
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CHAPTER 4
ANALYSIS
Introduction
The literature concerning Islamic extremism and radicalization clearly expressed the
complexity of the problem and the severity of this unique threat to the United States. This study
contributes to the research by examining and describing the perceptions of the local Muslim
community and comparing their perspective of the problem with the perspective obtained from
the prominent literature and published governmental policies regarding extremism and
radicalization.
Challenges Experienced in Administration of Survey
The administration of the survey to the local Muslim community presented some unique
challenges. First, the survey questions themselves contained questions that many within the
local Islamic community found offensive. The subject of terrorism and extremism linked with
the Islamic faith made for a very controversial topic and several members of the local Islamic
community were reluctant to participate in the study. Several meetings were held with a senior
member of the local Mosque to review the proposed survey questions and ensure that the
questions were not overly offensive to the local Muslim community, but the topic itself remains
a volatile subject, difficult to address without appearing to cause members of the local Muslim
community to become defensive. After several weeks of meeting with a local leader within the
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Muslim community and adhering to his advice on how to best structure the questions, the survey
was finally ready to be administered.
Even with the support of the local leadership, a majority of the Muslim population
appeared to be unwilling to participate in the study. However, those that did participate provided
some very strong opinions on the subject of extremism and the religion of Islam. In general, it is
likely that people with a strong or intense view are more likely to respond to a survey than
people who are less involved. For example, people who are ardent liberals or conservatives are
more likely to respond to political surveys than the “silent majority.” A copy of the survey
questions and results is located in Appendix A at the end of this study. Also, although three
separate Muslim leaders sent out e-mail messages to the members of the local mosque requesting
that they participate in the study, responses to the survey were few in number.
Data Collection and Summary of Results
The collection of survey results provided a clear picture of the perceptions of the local
Muslims who agreed to participate in the study. It is important to remember that these results are
only representative of a small percentage of the local Muslim community that participated in the
study and cannot be used to predict the perceptions or opinions of the local Muslim population as
a whole. However, the information provided by the study does make for some interesting
observations.
Although one of the key objectives of our current National Strategy is to ensure the
Muslim world that the United States is not waging a war against Islam, according to the results
of the survey it appears that 17% (3 of the 18 participants) of the local Muslims believed that
America is engaged in a religious war against Islam. Only 61% (11 of the 18 participants)
believed that the current United States war is not focused on religion. This observation begs the
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question, if 17% of local American Muslims believe that the United States is in fact waging a
religious war against Islam, how many more Muslims living outside the United States (and our
unique view of the world through American news stations) consider our country at war with
Islam? After all, the majority of news reported in the Islamic world comes from Al-Jazira news
and portrays a very different message from the one portrayed in the American media.
When asked whether or not American Foreign Policy was a contributing factor to the
existence of international extremist groups, a large portion (67%) of participants answered
“Yes.” This is also the same percentage (67%) of individuals who believed that Al-Queda
attacks are a result of American military involvement in the Muslim world. Furthermore, 61% of
the local Muslim population surveyed indicated that political differences such as the United
States being too involved in the affairs of other countries with 50% of the respondents going on
to cite a more specific reason (the United States’ support of Israel) as the most likely cause for
extremist attacks against the United States. The survey results clearly indicate that the local
American Muslim community believes that American foreign policy is more responsible for the
existence of extremist groups than foreign propaganda or other influences. This perception
(regardless of whether the perception is accurate)must continue to be addressed by the United
States if it is going to avoid a continued growth of extremist groups surge in violent attacks.
When asked what they believed was most responsible for Radicalization or caused a
person to take up an extremist ideology, half of the local Muslim community that participated in
the survey answered that poor political decisions made by American politicians which negatively
impacted the Muslim community and caused resentment led to Radicalization while only 17%
answered that anti-United States media and propaganda such as Al-Jazira and extremist Salafi
literature or Jihadi videotapes were the likely cause. This was a very different approach to
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determining the root cause of extremism than the views expressed by the governmental
documents (2007 National Intelligence Estimate) examined which claimed that the extremist
propaganda and extremist literature were a strong influence on the process of radicalization. Of
course, the United States government would want to avoid negative views of recent political
decisions / policies and instead place responsibility on the individuals who engage in the
proliferation of extremist ideology. Perhaps the truth lies somewhere in the middle of these two
theories with both the United States recent political decisions and the spread of an extremist
view of Islam through propaganda and Salafi literature being responsible for the increase in
extremist ideology.
The results of the survey also indicated that an overwhelming majority (89%) of the local
Muslim community thought that the United States was not justified in its invasion of Iraq in
2003. A slightly smaller percentage (56%) of the local Muslim population surveyed indicated
that they believed that the United States was not justified in invading Afghanistan after the
attacks on September 11th 2001. These views are most likely similar to the rest of the current
American population, but are arguably different from the Muslim communities living outside the
United States who again receive their news through a different media network.
When asked about the use of violence against American civilians or military forces, an
overwhelming 100% of the local Muslims indicated that violence against any civilian population
was un-acceptable, but only 33% believed that violence against United States military (serving
overseas) was unacceptable in response to the American government’s actions in the Muslim
world. While 33% of the participants believed that violence against the American military was
unacceptable, 39% indicated that the military was a legitimate target for a violent response. In
addition, 28% of the local Muslim community were undecided marking “I don’t know” when
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asked the question. The results of these two questions provided some interesting points to
consider. First, the unanimous agreement that violence against a civilian population was an
unacceptable action and not supported by the local Muslim community in any form supports
Islam as a peaceful religion and that extremist groups who resort to terrorist attacks against a
civilian population do not receive support from the Islamic community regardless of how the
extremist groups market their attacks as being in support of Islam. Second, the strong belief by
the local Islamic community condemning violent attacks against a civilian population should
serve as a guide to military leaders when considering future “Rule of Engagement” criteria and
military operations that take place in Urban terrain near large civilian populations. This
observation is supported later in the survey when 78% of the local Muslim population responded
that they did not believe that any civilian casualties would be worth the death or capture of a
high ranking terrorist such as Osama bin Laden or other Al-Qaida leader. It is also important to
note that this percentage might have been even higher, but three individuals who participated in
the survey chose not to answer this question.
Summary and Conclusions
This chapter analyzed the results of the survey in order to compare the answers provided by the
local Muslim community to the opinions provided by the leading authors and the information
found within the governmental documents discussed earlier in the Literature Review. The
results of the survey provided for some interesting observations and also provided a different
approach to trying to understand the complex issue of extremism. Based on the research and
answers to the secondary questions, the analysis suggests that there exist numerous causes or
influencers that lead to extremism. While leading authors and governmental documents suggest
Salafi Literature, extremist propaganda, etc. as being a leading cause in the growth of extremist
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groups, the local Islamic community views the recent governmental foreign policy as the
primary cause of the surge in extremist groups and activity. Chapter 5 will expand on this
conclusion as well as make several recommendations for action and further study.
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CHAPTER 5
CONCLUSIONS AND RECOMMENDATIONS
Introduction
The purpose of this thesis was to conduct a qualitative analysis of the sources of
extremism from multiple perspectives, determine if the current National Security Strategies and
governmental policies properly identify the sources of extremism, and make recommendations
on how to counter the sources of extremism and improve United States security and
counterterrorism strategy. This chapter draws conclusions from the analysis conducted in
Chapter 4 and makes recommendations on how to improve national security efforts,
counterterrorism strategy, and suggest additional research that can continue to add to the
understanding of the extremist threat. This chapter is organized into four parts: introduction,
conclusions and recommendations, areas for further study, and conclusion.
Conclusions and Recommendations
Listed below are two conclusions and recommendations reached after the analysis of the
literature review and survey results.
1. Extremist Ideology and Moderate Muslims. Both the literary review and the results
gathered from the analysis of the survey indicate that there is a clear distinction between the
extremist ideology and what is believed, taught, and practiced in the local Muslim community.
The common association most Americans make between Islam and terrorism is a dangerous
misconception and can lead to additional problems rather than a solution to the extremist threat.
Recommendation: The United States must continue to reassure the Muslim community (both in
words and in action) that the war on terror is not a war against Islam. In addition to the
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responsibility of our government to reach out to the local (and international) Islamic community,
The Muslim community must also become more involved in helping to manage American’s
perception of the Islamic faith by being willing to discuss openly the issue of terrorism and
extremism without fear or becoming overly defensive of their faith. The controversial issue of
terrorism and its perceived association or link to the Islamic faith needs to be addressed before a
united effort can be established among both Muslims and non-Muslims to combat an extremist
ideology and radicalization of impressionable youth.
2. Extremism and National Policy Both the literary review and the results obtained from the
analysis of the survey results clearly indicate that American Foreign Policy (specifically the
Israeli-Palestinian Issue) is a primary source, and some argue the birth or nucleus, of extremist
activity. Research also suggests that our continued military presence in traditional Islamic
countries and our recent military actions in Iraq and Afghanistan have resulted in an escalation
of the problem more than it has to combat the issue of extremism. Unfortunately, the political
environment is a difficult, complex arena with multiple variables influencing the decision
making process and there is not a simple answer or formula available to mitigate this central
problem.
Recommendation: The nation’s foreign policy must be careful not to alienate the international
Muslim community by making hasty decisions which can be perceived as hostile towards Islam.
Any hostile action perceived by the international community will only add to the extremists’
ability to influence young moderate Muslims toward a more violent ideology. Therefore, every
decision on foreign policy must be evaluated from an Islamic point of view and we must be able
to defend our intent in terms of combating extremist actions while avoiding the appearance of
aggression against the Islamic faith or people. Furthermore, based on the overwhelming
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response to the survey questions involving civilian casualties, the United States military will
need to continue to issue strict rules of engagement when operating in an urban environment.
The military must manage the perception of the local population and international Islamic
community to ensure that any civilian casualties are viewed as a result of extremist action; not
American military action. If extremist organizations can use civilian casualties (or inappropriate
military actions reported in the media) to highlight their cause, it will aid in their recruitment
efforts and continue to strengthen the resolve of those who support an extremist ideology.
Further Study
Additional literary sources are available for future study and comparison as well as other
Muslim communities. Specifically, it would be interesting to compare the survey results of the
small sample size obtained here in a small southern town in Mississippi with a similar size
sample from a larger metropolitan area. Additionally, it would also be interesting to compare the
survey results taken from the local Islamic community and compare them to a similar size
sample of non-Muslim Americans to see what differences can be identified.
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Appendix A: Extremism Survey Questions & Results
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Age of Participant:
18-21 2 / 11%; 22-30 6 / 33%;
Gender:
Male 15 / 83% Female
Citizenship:
USA 6 / 33% Other

31-40 6 / 33%;

>40 3 / 17%;

N/A 1 / 5% 18 Total

2 / 11% N/A 1/ 5%

11 / 61% N/A (No Answer)

1/ 5%

Survey Questions: - Please circle the answer that best represents your opinion. If you feel
uncomfortable answering a question, then please feel free to leave it blank and proceed to the
next question. Participants may stop taking the survey at any time. Thank you for your
participation in this study.
1. Please rank (1-3) the following according to your personal priorities in terms of how they
relate to your personal identity (1 being the highest priority/importance and 3 being the lowest
priority/importance).
____ Religion (13 / 72% Ranked as #1; 4 / 22% Ranked as #2; 1 / 5% Ranked as #3)
____ Family (3 / 17% Ranked as #1; 12 / 66% Ranked as #2; 2 / 11% Ranked as #3 w/ 1
N/A)
____ Country (American/Patriotism) (2 / 11% Ranked as #1; 1 / 5% Ranked as #2; 14 / 78%
Ranked as #3 w/ 1 / 5% N/A)
2. Do you consider yourself:
A. 0%
B. 8 / 44%
C. 10 / 56%

An Extremist
A Moderate Muslim (a practicing Muslim who claims Islam as their faith,
but does not dedicate 100% of their life to following their faith).
A Devout Muslim, (a practicing Muslim who has dedicated 100% of their
life to following their faith, but without extremist viewpoints.)

3. Is the American government at war with the religion of Islam?
A. 3 / 17%
B. 11 / 61%
C. 4 / 22%

YES (America is engaged in a religious war against Islam).
NO (America is engaged in war in Islamic countries, but not against the
religion of Islam).
I don’t know

4. Can a good Muslim be a good American?
A. 18 / 100%
B. 0 / 0%

YES
NO
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5. Do you believe that radical extremists hijacked planes and flew them into buildings on 9/11?
A. 7 / 39%
YES
B. 3 / 17%
NO
I don’t know
C. 8 / 44%
6. Do you believe that the U.S. government / administration had advance knowledge of the 9/11
attacks, and either organized the attacks or allowed the attacks to occur?
A. 3 / 17%
B. 4 / 22%
C. 11 / 61%

YES
NO
I don’t know. It is possible

7. Do you believe that American Foreign Policy is a contributing factor to the existence of
International Extremist groups such as Al-Queda?
A. 12 / 67%
B. 3 / 17%
C. 3 / 17%

Yes
No
I don’t Know

8. Do you believe that Al Qaeda is an Extremist terrorist organization trying to attack America?
A. 12 / 67%
B. 1/ 5%
C. 5 / 28%

YES
NO
I don’t know

9. Do you believe that Al Qaeda is attacking America because Al Qaeda hates American
freedoms?
A. 0 / 0%
B. 13 / 72%
C. 5 / 28%

YES
NO
I don’t know

10. Is Al Qaeda attacking America because of American military involvement in the Muslim
world?
A. 12 / 67%
B. 2 / 11%
C. 4 / 22%

YES
NO
I don’t know

11. Is it justifiable for the U.S. government to do any of the following in an attempt to prevent
terrorist attacks in America:
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- taking religion and ethnicity into account as one factor when deciding whom to interview and
search at airports?
A. 1 / 5% YES

B. 16 / 90% NO

C. 1 / 5% I don’t know

- monitoring activities at American mosques?
A. 1 / 5% YES

B. 15 / 83% NO

C. 1 / 5% I don’t know

(1 N/A)

- listening to phone calls of people in America whom the government claims are connected in
some way with Al Qaeda?
A. 1 / 5% YES

B. 6 / 33% NO

C. 11 / 61% Depends on the strength / evidence

- having an informer pretend to support or encourage violence against America, to see if the
targeted Muslims will decide to attack American targets?
A. 0 / 0% YES
collected
(1 N/A)

B. 6 / 33% NO

C. 11 / 61% Depends on amount of evidence

- monitoring Muslim charities in America, in the hopes of preventing funding for possible
terrorist attacks?
A. 2 / 11% YES

B. 13 / 72% NO

C. 3 / 17% I don’t know

12.
Which of the following reasons is the most likely cause for Extremist attacks against the
United States?
A. 0 / 0%
B. 11 / 61%
C. 0 / 0%
D. 9 / 50%
E. 5 / 28%

Religious Differences – Christianity V. Islam, Jihad, or Holy War
Political Differences – United States too involved in the affairs of other
countries
Cultural Differences – Westernization and U. S. influence on traditional
Islamic values.
Specific Reason – United States support of Israel
Uncertain / I don’t know

(Note: This question had several individuals who chose multiple responses.)

13. Which of the following do you feel is most responsible for Radicalization or causes a person
to take up an Extremist ideology?
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A. 3 / 17%
B. 9 / 50%
C. 1 / 5%
D. 3 / 17%
E. 2 / 11%

Anti-U.S. media/propaganda such as Al-Jazira & extremist Salafi
literature or jihadi videotapes propaganda.
Poor Political decisions made by American politicians which negatively
impact the Muslim community and cause resentment.
Personal attacks made against family members or feelings of resentment
that stem from being outcast due to religious beliefs.
All of the above
I don’t know

14.
Have you ever visited an Islamic Mosque that supports an extremist ideology or could
present a potential threat to the security of the United States?
A.

0 / 0% YES

B. 11 / 61% NO

C. 7 / 39% No such Mosque exists

If Yes, Was the Islamic Mosque:
A. Inside the United States
B. Outside the United States
C. 18 / 100% N/A (Not Applicable)
15.
If you, or a member of your family, have been questioned by the federal government at
any time after 9/11, how were you treated during the interview?
A. 1 / 5%
B. 0 / 0%
C. 17 / 94%

TREATED WELL
TREATED BADLY
Not Applicable – Have not been questioned by government authorities.

16. Was America justified in invading Iraq in 2003?
A. 0 / 0%
B. 16 / 89%
C. 2 / 11%

YES
NO
I don’t know

17. Was America justified in invading Afghanistan after 9/11?
A. 2 / 11%
B. 10 / 56%
C. 6 / 33%

YES
NO
I don’t know

18. Is violence against American civilians acceptable, in retaliation for the American
government’s actions in the Muslim world?
A. 0 / 0%
B. 18 / 100%

YES
NO
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C. 0 / 0%

I don’t know

19. Is violence against the American military overseas acceptable, in retaliation for the
American government’s actions in the Muslim world?
A. 7 / 39%
B. 6 / 33%
C. 5 / 28%

YES
NO
I don’t know

20. Is violence by Muslims against the American military in the U.S. acceptable, in retaliation
for the American government’s actions in the Muslim world?
A. 1 / 5%
B. 15 / 83%
C. 2 / 11%

YES
NO
I don’t know

21. Is violence by Muslims against American government officials acceptable, in retaliation for
the American government’s actions in the Muslim world?
A. 1 / 5%
B. 16 / 89%
C. 1 / 5%

YES
NO
I don’t know

22. If you learned about a plot to attack targets inside America, would you tell law enforcement
authorities?
A. 18 / 100%
B. 0 / 0%
C. 0 / 0%

YES
NO
I don’t know

23.
American military action sometimes results in civilian casualties. What do you think is
an “acceptable” civilian casualty rate when mounting a military attack against a High Value
Target (such as Osama Bin Laden or other Al-Qaida leader)?
A. 14 / 78%
B. 0 / 0%
C. 0/ 0%

None “0” – I do not believe that any civilian casualties are worth the death
or capture of a high ranking terrorist.
Less that 5 civilian casualties
Between 6 - 12 civilian casualties
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D. 1 / 5%

More than 12 – As long as the Terrorist Leader is captured or killed, the
civilian casualties, although regrettable, are a necessary cost we must
accept to end the war on Terror.

(Note: 3 individuals chose not to answer this question or mark N/A).
24. Do you feel that an individual or small group can be justified in targeting and/or killing
civilians to help them achieve their goal? Note: Unlike the question above where civilian
casualties were an unfortunate “collateral damage” to the primary military operation, this
question refers to the deliberate targeting of civilians as the objective of the military and not as a
consequence or unfortunate collateral damage during a raid on a military or political target.
A. 18 / 100%
B. 0 / 0%
C. 0 / 0%

Targeting civilians can never be justified.
Targeting civilians can sometimes be justified.
Targeting civilians is always justified – All is fair in war.

25. In your opinion, about what percentage of Muslim Mosques in this country are at risk for
teaching an extremist ideology or creating Muslim Extremists that might pose a potential threat
of Domestic Terrorism to this country?
A. 12 / 67%
B. 5 / 28%
C. 0 / 0%
D. 0 / 0%

0% - There is no threat of a Muslim Mosque teaching Islamic Extremism
or posing a threat of Radicalization and producing a Domestic Terrorism.
Less than 10% - no more than a Christian Church teaching a Radical form
of Christianity and producing a Domestic Terrorist.
Between 10 – 25%
More than 25%
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VITA
MAJ Scott M. Caldwell
260 County Road 418
Oxford, MS 38655
(662)202-6054
caldwell@olemiss.edu
EDUCATION:
Civilian Education BA, English, University of Mississippi, 1993
Military Education –
Basic Training, FT Jackson, SC
Armor Officer Basic Course, FT Knox, KY
Unit Movement Officer Course, FT Eustis, VA
Total Army Instructor Trainer Course, Camp Shelby, MS
Infantry Captains Career Course, FT Benning, GA
Combined Arms Exercise (CAX), Millington, TN
Military History Instructor Course, FT Leavenworth, KS
Inspector General Course, FT Belvoir, VA

1991
1994
1998
2002
2004
2006
2007
2008

CIVILIAN
1996-2006: Teacher (English/Spanish), Oxford High School
2006-2007: Recruiting and Operations Officer, University of Memphis
2007-Present: Assistant Professor of Military Science, University of Mississippi
MILITARY
Mississippi Army National Guard, Oxford, Mississippi
1999-2001: Platoon Leader, A Co. 2/198th AR, Oxford, MS/ Task Force Rifles SFOR X
Bosnia-Herzegovina
- Deployment to Bosnia-Herzegovina in support of Task Force Rifles SFOR X
rotation.
2000-2002:

Executive Officer, HHC 2/198th AR, Senatobia, MS
- Coordinate administrative and logistical support for HHC and corresponding
companies; took command in absence of the commander; supervise internal
security; track maintenance and supply issues; and coordinate with battalion staff.

2002-2004:

TAC Officer, 4th GSB RTI, Camp Shelby, MS
- Teach, Assess and Council Officer Candidates in the Art and Science of Military
Leadership. Evaluated Leadership potential and performance while teaching
skills such as: Military Tactics, Land Navigation/Terrain Association, Troop
Leading Procedures/Operation Order Process, etc.

2004-2006:

Commander, A Co. 2/198th AR, Oxford, MS/Operation Iraqi Freedom III,
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An Najaf, Iraq
- Provide leadership for a company of 78 soldiers deployed in support of
Operation Iraqi Freedom III to An Najaf, Iraq from 2004-2006. Duties include:
leading, planning, directing and supervising company operations; guiding the unit
in carrying out all missions; establishing unit policies and procedures;
establishing and maintaining operations security; initiating and ensuring unit
safety program is followed; ensuring unit readiness is maintained at all times;
performing periodic inspections to ensure unit readiness; stress principles of
accountability and maintenance; instruct and cross-train subordinates;
maintaining soldier strength; ensuring proper training is conducted as needed.
2006-2007:

TAC Officer, 4th GSB RTI, Camp Shelby, MS
- Teach, Assess and Council Officer Candidates in the Art and Science of Military
Leadership. Evaluated Leadership potential and performance while teaching
skills such as: Military Tactics, Land Navigation/Terrain Association, Troop
Leading Procedures/Operation Order Process, etc.

2007-2012:

Inspector General, 184th ESC, Laurel, MS
- Serves as the Deputy Inspector General to the Adjutant General. Responsible
for assisting the Inspector General in monitoring the morale, welfare, and
discipline of the Mississippi Army and Air National Guard consisting of over
13,000 Guardsmen. Reports on the discipline, efficiency, economy, morale,
training and readiness throughout the command. As required provides assistance
to assigned soldiers, airmen, civilians, and family members. Conducts general and
special inspections, performs inquiries and investigations, and serves as a teacher
and trainer on a wide variety of military related topics. Responsible for
identifying systemic issues and addressing them with the appropriate
organizations/staff agencies. Coordinates with the DOD, DA, and AF Inspector
General Offices on IG related matters. Supervise and monitor the work of two
Assistant IG's.
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US DECORATIONS / BADGES:
Mississippi War Medal
National Defense Service Medal (2nd Award)
Army Service Ribbon
Army Achievement Medal (3rd Award)
Army Reserve Component Achievement Medal (3rd Award)
Army Commendation Medal
Armed Forces Reserve Medal with M device (2nd Award)
Armed Forces Expeditionary Medal
NATO Medal
Overseas Service Ribbon
Global War on Terrorism Service Medal
Iraq Campaign Medal
Combat Action Badge
Bronze Star Medal
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